The Science of Selling free essay sample

The Persuaders: - The Science of Selling How are the exploration procedures of Dr. Clotaire Rapaille extraordinary or potentially equivalent to what we are finding out about in our course reading? Robert Weiss gives us a legit account dependent on experimentation of the Journey to subjective examination information, improved throughout the years with his experience working with numerous associates, companions, and educators. Weiss at first builds up a domain to get to What the respondent experienced (firsthand finding out about eople and their lives), while Dr. Rapaille has an objective of attempting to decide the underlying Why of encounters and dynamic, which he accepts to be oblivious encounters. The two of them utilize a type of subjective examination, yet with varying styles and techniques that may affect the objective or result. Our content reflects how Weiss got his beginning doing side Job meeting for Ernest Dichter, Inc. in view of profundity talking with which is grounded by a respondents oblivious encounter. We will compose a custom paper test on The Science of Selling or on the other hand any comparative subject explicitly for you Don't WasteYour Time Recruit WRITER Just 13.90/page Dr. Clotaire Rapaille likewise puts together his examination with respect to a similar establishment, however takes it further by announcing individuals have a psychological parkway, an oblivious code that revelation can split so as to get to the Why of exploration. Rapaille said he doesnt trust What individuals state in advance since they havent yet found the pre-sorted out information their inner mind is giving to impact their experience. Weisss models portray innovative collaboration, an open confiding in coalition so as to draw pecific graphic and fair records of inner and outside occasions that are later broke down. In the Frontline arrangement Science of Selling, Dr. Rapaille is immediate and goal on his hypothesis that the nonsensical psyche decides choices and not to confide in a customers (respondents) beginning What reaction. You have to burrow with strategies like center gatherings to get disclosure of their subconscious encounters that can be mapped to a psychological code that impacts choices and encounters. It appears the distinction of he two is the bearing of their vocations. Dr. Rapaille picked the way to high total assets through his strategic assistance organizations find what impacts choices and to figure out how to change that psychological engraving if important to buy an item. Weiss then again took an increasingly scholastic consultative way to help analysts with best practices on the most proficient method to perform subjective exploration by setting up a cooperative bond with respondents to pick up their trust so as to get to the subtleties and profundity of the examination theme.

Food Safety Program Of Metropolitan Best Meat Manufacturer Limited

Question: Talk about the Food Safety Program. Answer: Presentation Metropolitan Best Meat Manufacturer Limited is a main food fabricating organization in Australia. It has branches in Melbourne and Sydney. Since its foundation in 2003, the organization has been focused on providing quality meat and chicken items. The customers served by the organization are people and corporate associations. Be that as it may, to fulfill the differing needs of our customers, we have been having a decent supervisory group. Also, the organization has been setting up a great deal of measures to deliver safe food that can't make any risk the customers (Nummer, Gump, Wells, Zimmerman Montalbano 2015). This is the reason the organization has a far reaching sanitation plan for all the items. HACCP-based Food Safety Plans HACCP Team The HACCP is answerable for the powerful execution of HACCP rules in the organization. The HACCP group at the Metropolitan Best Meat Manufacturer is made out of the accompanying work force: NAME POSITION IN COMPANY Group LEADER Mary Alake Tasks Manager Colleague Brian Fouler Boss Chef Colleague Mohammed Abdulla Gourmet expert Colleague George Pocola Gourmet expert Degree and Purpose Metropolitan Best Meat Manufacturer is resolved to be the best meat provider in Australia. It has along these lines built up a sanitation intend to help in keeping the fabricated food items from messing wellbeing up to the laborers and customers too. The arrangement will help in managing malady causing miniaturized scale living beings, for example, Salmonella and Campylobacter during the assembling, stockpiling, pressing, and use (Pierson 2012). Item Description and Intended Use Item Name Frankfurter Fixings utilized/organization New Structure Somewhere in the range of 3C and 6C Bundling 10 grams Time span of usability 21 days Capacity and Transport Pre-pressed Expected Use Can be cooked or eaten when crude Buyer General utilization Procedure Flow Chart 1. Buying 2. Unloading and defrosting 3. Cutting 4. Capacity 5. Bowl cleaving 6. Blending and including the Ingredients 7. Filling 8. Discovery 9. Maturation 10. Aging 13. Pressing, marking, flexibly to the objective clients Peril Analysis CCP= Critical Control Point SP= Support Program Procedure STEP Peril CONTROL MEASURE Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 CCP Buying Defilement of fixings and food by pesticides and anti-infection agents during transportation (Nielsen 2014). Investigation during gathering Y CPP Unloading and Thawing The microorganisms can develop in the meat if there are changes in temperature Investigation of the food by the administrator Y N CPP Cutting Defilement by pathogens Temperature guideline Y Y SP Capacity Defilement by pathogens Guideline of temperatures N Y SP Bowl slashing Metal defilement Fitting review Y CPP Blending and including fixings Defilement by microorganisms Investigation Y N SP Filling Defilement by metal Discovery of metal in time Y Y CPP Maturation Delayed maturation can energize development of pathogens (Zwietering, Ross Gorris 2014). Guideline of the temperature Y Y N CPP Pressing, naming, and flexibly to the objective customers Poor naming of the food bundles; defilement during transportation Severe adherence of marking guidelines Y N SP References: Nielsen, S. ed., 2014. Food examination. Springer Science Business Media: New York. Nummer, B., Gump, D., Wells, S., Zimmerman, S. Montalbano, A., 2015. Danger Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP). In Regulatory Foundations for the Food Protection Professional. Springer: New York. Pierson, M.D., 2012. HACCP: standards and applications. Springer Science Business Media: New York. Zwietering, M.H., Ross, T. Gorris, L.G.M., 2014. Sanitation confirmation frameworks: Microbiological testing, inspecting plans, and microbiological measures. In Encyclopedia of Food Safety, Volume 4: Food Safety Management (pp. 244-253). Scholarly Press.

“Philosophers”, “architects”, “dreamy professors” Essay

These designations are frequently used to portray the INTP character type. INTPs love speculations and accept that everything can be broke down and improved. They are not that worried about this present reality and handy things †from the INTPs’ viewpoint, it is frequently less energizing than thoughts and scholarly interests. Individuals with this character type have no troubles seeing themes where others can't †this makes them splendid scholars and examiners. The collected information is the most esteemed resource of any INTP. Envision a colossally convoluted perfect timing which is continually engrossing, handling and creating a wide range of hypotheses †this is the manner by which the INTP mind works. Individuals with the INTP character type have the most consistently exact psyche of all character types †they can undoubtedly see even the smallest errors between two proclamations, regardless of how much time would have gone in the middle. It is a poorly c onceived notion to mislead an INTP. They may seem fantastic some of the time, however this isn't on the grounds that their psyche is resting †an incredible inverse. INTPs are excited and unprejudiced with regards to managing issues †they drill through the subtleties and afterward build up a one of a kind methodology and at last a reasonable arrangement. INTPs are generally savvy and quick individuals, ready to stay fair in any circumstance. They completely love new thoughts and hypotheses and could never botch a chance to talk about them with others †be that as it may, this ceaseless reasoning procedure likewise makes them look to some degree contemplative and isolates, as INTPs are impeccably ready to lead undeniable discussions in their own heads. Individuals with this character type may likewise discover it very hard to disclose their contemplations to other people, in any event, when it becomes evident that their hypotheses are not effectively graspable. INTPs may likewise proceed onward to another subject before their associates or accomplices have made sense of what the INTP needed to state. INTPs can't stand routine work †they would much rather handle a troublesome hypothetical issue. INTP characters truly have no restrictions with regards to hypothetical conundrums †if there is no simple arrangement and the th eme is sufficiently fascinating, an INTP can spend ages attempting to think of an answer. INTP characters are typically extremely bashful and hesitant with regards to meeting others. Be that as it may, INTPs can likewise be inviting and certain when they connect with individuals they know well or discussion about things that intrigue them. INTPs are adaptable and loose in almost all situations,â except when their convictions or obvious end results are being scrutinized. In those cases, the INTP is probably going to turn out to be exceptionally protective and contend eagerly. Offering numerous character qualities to other T types, INTPs don't generally comprehend or esteem choices dependent on sentiments or abstract suppositions. As they would see it, the main great arrangement is the legitimate arrangement †INTPs don't see a point in utilizing passionate contentions. Such a methodology safeguards the â€Å"sanctity† of their scholarly technique; in any case, this likewise makes it hard for INTP characters to comprehend different people’s sentiments or fulfill their enthusiastic needs. People with the INTP character type are probably going to b e liberal and even unconventional. These attributes, joined with their ability for imagination and unique idea, make up a very Whether the chicken went across the street or the street crossed the chicken relies upon your casing of reference. Albert Einsteinâ powerful blend †it isn't astounding that INTPs are liable for some logical disclosures. An INTP is probably not going to think much about social desires and the â€Å"usual† objectives, for example, professional stability †notwithstanding, they will give a valiant effort to discover a domain where their inventive virtuoso and potential can be communicated. One of only a handful barely any bottlenecks that INTPs force upon themselves is their anxious dread of conceivable disappointment. No other character type stresses that a lot over missing a bit of the psychological riddle or ignoring some urgent reality that may prompt a superior arrangement. Not at all like their progressively certain INTJ or ENTJ cousins, INTPs could spend ages pondering their activities. In any event, when an INTP is contending with somebody, this ought to be thought about while taking other factors into consideration †they should be contending with their own psyche. In t he event that you might want to get familiar with the INTP character type and its qualities, download the INTP In-Depth Profile †a 60+ page manage covering various differing subjects.

Create an improvisation inspired Essay Example For Students

Make a spontaneous creation motivated Essay We were approached to make an ad lib propelled by The Woman dressed in Black. The content we utilized was a concentrate from Susan Hills tale where Spider fled over the swamps when he heard the strange whistle. We thought of numerous thoughts while talking about conceivable plotlines. We enjoyed a few of these, yet we chose to drop them. For instance: we had a thought where they were lost in an ocean of individuals, and various voices and sounds, (for example, whistles) could be heard on the off chance that you listened close enough, yet in the event that you tuned in to hard the apparitions of your past would trap you in their domain. In any case, we concluded that in spite of the fact that we enjoyed this thought it would require a greater amount of us to act it and the plot would be hard to pass on. The last plot is a man strolling a pooch in a hazy park, when the lead snaps he loses his canine in the thick fog. He calls for Spider, getting increasingly fomented, at that point a creepy whistle insults him and he goes around in edgy hunt where he finds figures speaking to his companions, they dont remember him, however they cause him to recall (by cross cutting) the last time he had seen them previously. These upbeat recollections diverge from the awful news the whistler brings. The whistler is a dead plane driver that advises him he had recently executed his fianc㠯⠿â ½e, closest companion and manager in a plane accident. At that point he at last understands that he has quite recently observed phantoms surrounding him. Ben played the man with his pooch. He was moderately aged and was in a sound connection with his fianc㠯⠿â ½. He dresses typically, and moves consistently more agitatedly and jumpily all through the play. He was an upbeat man who had quite recently experienced extraordinary occasions that had made him very glad. The trademark that marks him out is that he thinks about three individuals more than anything on earth, and when he loses Spider in the cloudy park it represents him losing himself. Debris played his fianc㠯⠿â ½e. She was uproarious and bubbly, and her changeless smile and enormous motions demonstrated this quite well. She had no exceptional qualities, yet she moved in a way which demonstrated that she truly cherished her fianc㠯⠿â ½. As they were in an extravagant eatery she would have been wearing a basic, however lovely dress. Josh played a football star that had made it in America and who had quite recently included on a TV program over yonder. He wore a creator tracksuit as he was energetic and progressing admirably. He additionally strangely had a spring in his progression and when he got energized he bobbed closely following his feet. This gave us that he was a functioning and volatile individual. I played the plane pilot whose plane accident had caused the passing of numerous individuals including mine. She was a lady of little words, who experienced difficulty with associating with individuals. Be that as it may, she was solid in her motivation, and she was unable to rest until she had advised the man she was sorry to have caused the passing of his friends and family. I played this spooky and to some degree fearsome character by moving gradually however eagerly, making it seem as though I had a firm reason as a top priority to pass on the characters desperation, yet simultaneously not to twist the characters evasion of individuals. To stress this shirking I likewise made the character not talk a ton, and when I spoke I ensured the words sounded crude and corroded, as though the individual wasnt used to talking. This additionally made the character appear to be not so much human but rather more spooky, as the characters non-verbal communication was from the start odd and scar ing. .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e , .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .postImageUrl , .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .focused content territory { min-stature: 80px; position: relative; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e , .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:hover , .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:visited , .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:active { border:0!important; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .clearfix:after { content: ; show: table; clear: both; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e { show: square; change: foundation shading 250ms; webkit-progress: foundation shading 250ms; width: 100%; murkiness: 1; change: obscurity 250ms; webkit-change: darkness 250ms; foundation shading: #95A5A6; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:active , .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:hover { haziness: 1; change: mistiness 250ms; webkit-progress: darkness 250ms; foundation shading: #2C3E50; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .focused content region { width: 100%; position: relativ e; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .ctaText { outskirt base: 0 strong #fff; shading: #2980B9; text dimension: 16px; textual style weight: striking; edge: 0; cushioning: 0; content design: underline; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .postTitle { shading: #FFFFFF; text dimension: 16px; textual style weight: 600; edge: 0; cushioning: 0; width: 100%; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .ctaButton { foundation shading: #7F8C8D!important; shading: #2980B9; fringe: none; outskirt sweep: 3px; box-shadow: none; text dimension: 14px; textual style weight: intense; line-tallness: 26px; moz-outskirt span: 3px; content adjust: focus; content enhancement: none; content shadow: none; width: 80px; min-stature: 80px; foundation: url(https://artscolumbia.org/wp-content/modules/intelly-related-posts/resources/pictures/straightforward arrow.png)no-rehash; position: outright; right: 0; top: 0; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:hover .ctaButton { foundation shading: #34495E!important; } .u90 bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e .focused content { show: table; stature: 80px; cushioning left: 18px; top: 0; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e-content { show: table-cell; edge: 0; cushioning: 0; cushioning right: 108px; position: relative; vertical-adjust: center; width: 100%; } .u90bf2d89d105efeb4d6068596f59b46e:after { content: ; show: square; clear: both; } READ: Criticism of to a waterfowl EssayThe explorative techniques we were required to use as a component of the workshop were cross-cutting and still picture. We likewise decided to utilize thought following. We utilized idea following to clarify and portray the keeps an eye on complex emotions in the recreation center so the crowd would comprehend and identify with the torment the man was experiencing. My creation him voice his frenzy and uncover his internal feelings of dread caused the piece to accomplish its motivation and alarm and stress the crowd, though on the off chance that he was peacefully it wouldnt have been a s clear, terrifying or as intriguing. Cross slicing helped us pass on to the crowd that the last examples he saw his friends and family were warm occasions that recommended a long obligation of kinship, and helped us do this rapidly, succinctly and adequately. It helped the scene significantly by giving the man a back story so the crowd would me increasingly worried in his situation. We utilized despite everything picture toward the start and end of each cross slice to make the cross cuts increasingly exact thus it appeared as though a bit of a memory where it was solidified, and how there would have been more to come, yet the puzzling park had befuddled and scrambled them all into one. It helped the scene drastically by permitting the crowd the crowd see the connections between the characters.

Soup Dumplings, Fever Pitch

Soup Dumplings, Fever Pitch Yesterday after work I headed downtown for the evening. First stop was one of my favorite restuarants in Chinatown: Taiwan Cafe. Taiwan Cafe is the best place in town for soup dumplings (very, very yummy). Taiwan cafe in Bostons Chinatown. Soup dumplings are delicious and fun to eat. For more blog entries that begin with great food recommendations, browse on over to Mitras blog (this week: Thai food at Chili Duck). After dinner, it was over to the Boston Common Theater, Bostons largest (and most expensive) movie theater. When I walked in, I saw a big crowd of geeks, and suddenly remembered that this was the night of the super-secret pre-screening of Joss Whedons next film, Serenity (trailer here). Of course, I was one of the many folks who didnt get tickets. Instead, I watched Fever Pitch (with Drew Barrymore and Jimmy Fallon, directed by the Farrelly brothers). There were many great shots of Boston, and I thought the film well captured New Englands passion for the Red Sox, but the love story seemed to fall a little flat. And for those of you who were upset by the changes from the book to movie version of Hitchhikers Guide, you should read the Nick Hornby novel on which this movie is very loosely based (Id say Clueless is a more faithful adaptation of Emma). The largest similarity, I suppose, is between the long-suffering fans of Arsenal and of the Red Sox (and, by implication, Manchester United and the Yankees). Interestingly, both Arsenal and the Red Sox (both of whom I root for) majestically won it all in 2004. In the last couple weeks, though, I have seen some trailers for movies Im pretty excited about, including The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe and Howls Moving Castle. and (big confession here) even though I didnt much care for the book, The DaVinci Code (its got Tom Hanks and Audrey Tautou, not to mention Ian McKellen, Alfred Molina and Jean Reno?!). Which upcoming films are you excited about?

Board Characteristics And Corporate Performance In Tunisia - Free Essay Example

Abstract Drawing upon prior empirical research on the potential endogeneity of both ownership structure and firm performance in developed markets, this study examines the reverse causations that can exist between corporate performance and ownership structure in Tunisian listed companies. The study was extended to include another governance mechanism board characteristics as the principal internal control mechanism for monitoring managers and an assessment of its potential effects on firm performance and ownership structure. Our findings proved the existence of endogeneity and a two-way causality between ownership variables and MTB performance. However, our findings also revealed that corporate governance in Tunisian firms needed to be more strengthened based on board characteristics. Keywords: corporate governance, ownership structure, board characteristics, corporate performance, endogeneity, simultaneous equations models. Introduction The relation between ownership structure and performance has been a matter for an important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature. The debate goes back to Berle and Means thesis (1932). Since then, researchers have been interested in the effects of a separation between ownership and control of corporate enterprises. This separation creates agency costs because owners (principals) and managers (agents) have different objective functions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There are different monitoring mechanisms that, if implemented, should improve corporate governance. Furthermore, there are internal and external mechanisms. The external ones (e.g. market for corporate control) are particularly important in the Anglo-Saxon systems that experience dispersed ownership structures. The internal mechanisms (e.g. ownership concentration and board of directors) are, somewhat, predominant in emergent markets, including Tunisia. We investigate the Tunisian context that is completel y different from the Anglo-Saxon one, where shareholders are mainly concerned with the value of their portfolios. This is true in most emergent countries, where ownership structures are very concentrated, institutional investor shareholding is very low and the board of directors represents the main organ of governance. Our study presents a new evidence of the corporate ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance in Tunisia. First, we examine the influence of ownership structure (ownership concentration and insider ownership) on firm performance with particular attention to the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. We note that equity ownership by managers and monitoring by large blockholders are two ways that can potentially reduce the severity of the agency problem between managers and outside shareholders. Second, we analyze the impact of board characteristics on the performance of the firm. Finally, we evaluate the possible endogeneity between firm performance and ownership structure (concentrated ownership and managerial ownership). Thus, we consider ownership structure as endogenous and we try to identify its determinants. This is a useful contribution to the literature, as we are not aware of any other study, in the Tunisian context, of the endogeneity of ownership structure. In addition, endogeneity is important in practice but difficult and underexplored in empirical corporate governance research. Our findings proved the existence of endogeneity and a two-way causality between ownership variables and MTB performance. In addition, the monitoring mechanism (board of directors) has, above all, an insignificant influence on firm value. The last finding confirms the weakness of this mechanism in Tunisian listed firms. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional environment in Tunisia. In section 3, we briefly review the theoretical and empirical arguments defining the relationships that exist between governance aspects (ownership structure and board characteristics) and firm performance. We present the data and specify the variables used in our study in section 4. Our empirical results are given in section 5. Finally, our conclusion is presented in section 6. Institutional environment in Tunisia The Tunisian case presents many interesting features that make its study relevant in terms of policy recommendations for this country and for others in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We first present the principal characteristics of MENA region and then we present the main features of the Tunisian context. 2.1 Corporate governance in MENA regionÂÂ   In most MENA countries, the financial markets are thin and rigidly regulated, government ownership is prevalent and the market forces have a limited role. Corporate governance in MENA economies present four main characteristics: concentration of ownership (due to large family dominated companies), family ownership and control (the market for corporate control is not active throughout the region), bank-based corporate finance (bank loans are the most important form of external finance) and underdeveloped capital markets (capital markets lag behind the banking sector and foreign participation is limited). Corporate governance in MENA countries is also characterised by a major role of the board of directors, the absence of call for a separation between the chair and the CEO, limited protection of the shareholders rights and the absence of board independence. Corporate governance in MENA region needs to be recognised as a public policy concern of rapidly increasing importance in the regi on. However, the number of large companies contributing to growth is still limited. 2.2 Corporate governance in Tunisian listed firms Corporate governance in Tunisia has generally improved in recent years. In fact, a tentative of corporate governance best practices has lastly (in June 2008) been implemented in Tunisia by the Arab Institute of Business Managers. However, the firms commercial code has constituted up to now, the main reference concerning corporate governance. The fundamental principles of this code are the protection of the shareholders rights, the equitable treatment of the shareholders (including the minorities) and the transparency and diffusion of information. Indeed, the board of directors (or the supervisory board and the executive one) constitute the main organ of governance in Tunisian firms. For both structures, the Law specifies the size, composition, responsibilities and tenure of its members. The board of directors (BOD) is composed of at least three members and of twelve members at most. A shareholder is not required to sit on the board, indeed an employee of the firm can be nominated as a member. Directors tenure is limited to three years that can be renewed. The BOD elects the CEO who must be a shareholder. The BOD is vested with the most extended powers to act in all circumstances in the name of the firm. Besides, they cannot deliberate any valid decision without at least half of their members being present or represented. The second main feature of Tunisian corporate governance is ownership concentration. In fact, the Tunisian system is characterised by the presence of strong blockholders (often including families) which leads to agency problems between blockholders and minority shareholders. In fact, 80% of total shares are held by the five largest shareholders (Omri, 2003). In addition to families, the state and banks hold an important part in the shares of the listed firms. However, the participation of the state is becoming more limited due to privatization. Moreover, foreign investors can participate within the limits of 50 percent of the offering of a company. Nevertheless, they hold less than 10 percent of all stocks. Finally, the participation of institutional investors is still very limited. 2.3 Tunisian stock market The Tunisian financial market consists of the semi-privatized Tunis Stock Exchange (TSE). The government intended the TSE, opened in 1990, to serve as an additional source of funding through the mobilization of domestic and foreign investments. The TSE is regulated by a state-run watchdog, the Financial Market Council. The stock market was reformed according to international standards in 1994. Later, the TSE was privatized in 1995 and became the central part in the Tunisian financial market. The Tunisian financial system is dominated by banks with domestic bonds. However, equity markets are playing a limited role in savings mobilization. In Tunisia, the government bonds represent the majority of tradable securities, principally due to the absence of companies that are able to make public offering securities. On the other hand, the most widely used and modern company structures are the limited liability companies and joint stock companies. Only the latter ones may issue shares to the public and thus be listed on the TSE. Once primarily based on agriculture, the Tunisian economy has become more varied with important manufacturing and tourism sectors. The number of firms listed on the TSE increased from 13 to 45 between 1991 and 2003. At the end of 2007, only 50 companies were listed. Hence, the market capitalization increased from TND 610 million in 1991 to TND 2.98 billion (approximately US $ 2.34 billion) in 2003. At the end of 2006, it reached TND 5.49 billion (approximately US $ 4.32 billion). Although growing in importance, the TSE remains small and relatively illiquid. For these reasons and in order to increase the market activity, many reforms have been implemented. Among these reforms, the government implements fiscal advantages to encourage companies to list their stock on TSE, gr ants financial incentives to make the stock market more attractive and allows foreigners to buy up to 50 percent of a firms shares on TSE. Despite these important incentives, there has been no inherent interest for firms in being listed on the stock market. Literature review Ownership structure is a central and distinguishing theme in the corporate governance literature. We consider two issues of shareholding that are addressed in research: ownership concentration and insider ownership. In addition, the relation between board characteristics and firm performance remains a fundamental issue in the corporate governance literature. 3.1 Ownership concentration and firm performance Ownership concentration is considered as a key governance mechanism. Empirical research has examined the importance of block or large shareholdings in controlling managers, and hence reducing agency costs. The results of these researches are mixed. The expected performance effect of ownership concentration is unclear, as it reflects the net impact of benefits and costs. Following Berle and Means (1932) and until the eighties, the literature had focused on the advantages of ownership concentration. The main concern was the cost of the separation between ownership and control, or the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The idea is that dispersed ownership in large firms increases the principal-agent problem due to asymmetric information and uncertainty. A review of the studies on the relationship between ownership and performance indicates, in general, a higher profitability in owner-controlled firms as compared to manager-controlled firms (Short, 1994). There is a widespread con sensus that a higher degree of control by an external shareholder enhances productivity performance. Chen et al. (2005) report a weak relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large shareholders have the incentive to monitor firm management, and that the presence of large shareholders enhances firm performance. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find a positive relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. However, the relation is nonlinear indicating that concentration has adverse effects on performance after a certain level. Cho (1998) does not detect any significant link between firm value and shares held by large shareholders. Denis and Denis (1994) analyze samples of U.S. firms with low and high ownership and find that there is no significant difference in the firm value between them. Other similar international studies (e.g. Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo (2007) for Spain) report insignificant relationships between concentrated ownership and performance. Large shareholders are assumed to play a monitoring role that raises the value of the shares for the minority. However, concentrated ownership also gives the insiders (owners and managers) the opportunity to expropriate efficiently (La Porta et al., 2000). Consequently, monitoring managers is not the main problem of corporate governance and the real concern is the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. Ownership concentration may lead to the extraction of private benefits by controlling blockholders at the expense of minority. 3.2 Managerial ownership and firm performance The conflict of interest between managers and outside shareholders is another version of agency problem that is less likely to be observed in a highly concentrated equity ownership structure. The extent of managerial shareholding affects the congruence between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Whereas the primary governance function of outside owners is to monitor management, a larger insider stake reduces the need for such control. Managerial ownership is one way to align the objective functions of the owners and of the managers. The convergence of interest hypotheses predicts that insider holdings and economic performance are positively related. From this incentive effect, a positive association between managerial ownership and firm performance is expected. In the same vein, Krivogorsky (2006) finds a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, this relationship remains insignificant. Cornett et al. (2008) detect a positive and significant association between managerial ownership and performance. On the other hand, if managers hold large shares of the equity, it becomes more difficult for outside owners to exercise control. This entrenchment effect is especially important for high shares of managerial ownership. In this case, managers will not probably maximize firm value and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance is possible. Switzer (2007) finds a negative and insignificant relation between CEO ownership and Tobins Q using 3SLS regression. Moreover, Morck et al. (1988), among others, show that there is a complex relationship between agency costs and managerial shareholdings. Taking the incentive hypothesis and the entrenchment one into account, a non-linear relationship between managements ownership share and firm performance is expected. At low levels of ownership, the incentive effect is probably dominant, that is, a positive effect is expected. However, at very high levels of ownership, the entrenchment effect might be more important and the effect of ownership on performance could be negative. 3.3 Board characteristics and firm performance Fama (1980) argues that the board of directors is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers that help control agency problems. The board plays a major role in the corporate governance framework and is responsible for monitoring managerial performance and preventing conflicts of interests. 3.3.1 Board size Agency theory predicts that because groups communicate less effectively beyond a certain size, there is pressure from self-serving managers or entrenched owners to expand board size beyond its value maximizing level. The implication is an inverse relationship between board size and performance. Empirical research also reports conflicting results concerning the association between board size and performance. For instance, Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Cornett et al. (2008) report a negative relation. Cheng (2008) shows that larger boards are associated with lower performance. This association is consistent with the view that both coordination/communication problems and agency problems become more severe as a board grows larger. Conversely, Bhagat and Black (2002), Chen et al. (2005) and Black et al. (2006) do not find a statistically significant association. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Adams and Mehran (2005) find positive board size effects on firm performance. Accord ingly, a larger board size brings more resources to firms and, therefore, might improve their performance. 3.3.2 Board composition In order to effectively fulfil their monitoring role, boards must have some degree of independence from management. Indeed, outside directors can play an active role in arbitrating in disagreements between internal managers and help reduce agency problems between managers and residual claimants. Several studies test for the effect of outside directors representation on the board on performance and the results are mixed. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that stock markets react positively to the appointment of outside directors. Using data from New Zealand, Hossain et al. (2000) also find a positive relationship between higher levels of board independence and firm performance. Chung et al. (2003) find that board independence affects performance positively through the ability of outside directors to provide effective management-monitor activities. However, Bhagat and Black (2002) find a negative association between the proportion of outside directors and firm value. On the other hand, Adams and Mehran (2005), Prevost et al. (2002) and Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) do not find a statistically significant relationship. 3.3.3 Board leadership structure When the CEO is also the chairperson, the capacity of the board to monitor the CEO is weaker (Jensen, 1993). Gul and Leung (2004) suggest that CEOs who also serve as board chairpersons could reduce the boards ability to exercise effective control over management and thereby negatively affect performance. Brickley et al. (1997) argue that there are also costs associated with having two persons holding the CEO and chairperson titles. They find no evidence that firms with separate persons holding the CEO and chairperson titles perform better than those with the same person holding both titles. In contrast, Pi and Timme (1993) find that firms with one person holding both titles have less cost efficiency and performance than those with two persons holding the two titles. Krivogrsky (2006) and Cornett et al. (2008) detect a negative relation between CEO duality and firm performance. Chen et al. (2005) find the same relation when they use Market-to-Book. However, they find insignificant rel ation when they use ROA and ROE as measures of performance. Data and methodology 4.1 Sample and data Our sample includes an unbalanced panel of 23 non-financial companies listed on the TSE during the period 1998-2006. Companies from the banking and financial sectors are removed from the sample. The financial services sector includes several trusts, which have distinctive different corporate governance structures from other firms. In addition, financial firms are subject to a regulatory framework which may affect the ownership-performance relationship. Our sample size includes 181 firm-year observations with a predominance of industrial firms (61%) in comparison to firms from the service sector (39%). Moreover, the service sector includes firms in communication, transportation, tourism, etc. Company annual reports, obtained from the Financial Market Council, are used as the source for the shareholding structure and for board characteristics. Financial and accounting data come from the TSE. 4.2 Definitions of the variables Our specification of the variables used in this study draws on the current literature in empirical corporate finance, though we are somewhat constrained by data availability for Tunisian firms. 4.2.1 Performance variable We use the natural logarithm of the Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) in order to measure firm performance. MTB ratio is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. The market value of equity uses closing prices for shares on the last trading day of the year. This ratio is also an indicator of growth opportunities. It is important to note that the MTB ratio is a permanent valuation indicator of choices of the firm, of management and of strategic perspectives. It also depends on the anticipations of the investors. 4.2.2 Ownership structure It is represented by ownership concentration (CO) and managerial ownership (MO). The former is measured by the Herfindhal index calculated by summing the squared percentages of shares held by the three largest shareholders. The latter is defined as the percentage of ordinary shares held directly by the CEO and executive directors. Based on the discussion presented above, we would expect to find either positive or negative effects of ownership variables (ownership concentration and managerial ownership) on firm performance. 4.2.3 Board characteristics They are represented by board size, board composition and board structure. Board size (BS) is measured as the total number of directors on board. Lower board size is associated with greater firm performance. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between these two variables. Board composition (BC) is defined as the number of outside directors on the board divided by the total number of directors. Greater board independence (outside directors) is associated with greater firm performance. This leads to predict that board composition is positively related to firm performance. Board leadership structure (CEO) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO and the chairman are different persons (i.e. separation of functions) and 0 otherwise. In fact, the value of 1 strengthens the level of independence between the board and the leadership. We expect board leadership structure to be positively associated with firm performance. 4.2.4 The control variables Firm size (LTA) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm size may affect both firm performance and ownership structure of listed companies. Large firms benefit from scale economies and have better access to financial resources. As a result, firm performance will be improved. Therefore, we expect firm size to be positively related to firm performance. On the other hand, larger firms require more investment from an owner of a given proportion of shares. Therefore, the amount that has to be invested for a given share should be larger. Hence, previous studies, such as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), usually argue that ownership concentration and managerial ownership decrease with the size of the firm, which we expect to be negatively associated, with the ownership variables. Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. There is some ambiguity in the expected sign of debt. The signalling hypothesis proposed by Ross (1977) and the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) support a positive relationship. Alternatively, the pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts a negative association between debt and firm performance. Indeed, as far as the Tunisian firms are concerned, we could argue a negative effect of leverage on firm performance. Tunisian listed companies are heavily in debt. Otherwise, in the ownership equations, leverage serves to reflect the creditors monitoring of management. In this case, debt can discourage managers to entrench themselves in large shareholdings. In addition, larger value of debt is associated with lower percentages of shares owned by the largest shareholders. Based on these arguments, we predict that leverage is negatively related to firm performance and to the ownership variables. Liquidity (LIQ) is defined as net working capital as a fraction of the book value of assets. We use this variable in the ownership equation as a control variable. Indeed, greater liquidity is associated with greater agency costs (Gonenc, 2006). This means that management is not monitored effectively. Consequently, if the management and shareholders have aligned interests, we should observe a negative relationship between liquidity and ownership concentration (or managerial ownership). Nevertheless, if the interests diverge, the relationship must be positive. Market risk is assessed by the beta coefficient (BET) of the stock. Market risk measures the risks inherent in stock ownership; it is estimated by the market model through a regression of the monthly return on a stock. Therefore, variation in risk causes variation on ownership structure. In fact, higher market risk signifies higher return for shareholders. When shareholders (concentrated owners or managers) can effectively make predictions about future economic conditions, the market risk makes higher ownership less costly (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Accordingly, the estimated sign of BET should be positive. However, when concentrated owners and managers are risk averse, they tend to reduce their participation. In this case, the estimated sign of BET must be negative. 4.3 Methodology Our primary objective is to evaluate the relationship existing between firm performance and ownership structure. To do this, we developed two different models to check the relation between our different variables. In the first model, we used a linear regression to examine the simple links. We developed two sets of equations. The first set had firm performance as the dependent variable. The ownership concentration (managerial ownership) was the independent variable in the first (second) equation. The second set included ownership variables as the endogenous variables in two different equations in which the firm performance was the exogenous variable. Moreover, several previous studies had proved that the association between managerial ownership and managerial ownership was not linear. For this reason, we included the squared value of managerial ownership in the performance equation in order to check the curvilinear relation between these two variables. The first model (Model 1) came as follow: MTBit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 COit + ÃŽÂ ²2 BSit + ÃŽÂ ²3 BCit + ÃŽÂ ²4 CEOit + ÃŽÂ ²5 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²6 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (1) MTBit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 MOit + ÃŽÂ ²2 (MO)2it + ÃŽÂ ²3 BSit + ÃŽÂ ²4 BCit + ÃŽÂ ²5 CEOit + ÃŽÂ ²6 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²7 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (2) COit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 MTBit + ÃŽÂ ²2 BSit + ÃŽÂ ²3 BCit + ÃŽÂ ²4 CEOit + ÃŽÂ ²5 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²6 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (3) MOit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 MTBit + ÃŽÂ ²2 BSit + ÃŽÂ ²3 BCit + ÃŽÂ ²4 CEOit + ÃŽÂ ²5 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²6 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (4) In the second model, we considered ownership structure as an endogenous variable that could be influenced, among other observed factors, by firm performance. Consequently, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance should be detected in the two ways. Hence, the consideration of endogeneity requires working with simultaneous equations models. For this reason, we developed a system of three simultaneous equations. To estimate this system empirically, we employed the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. The first equation relates to firm performance as a dependent variable while the second and the third ones relate to concentrated ownership and managerial ownership as dependent variables. To test our hypotheses, the following model (Model 2) was used: MTBit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 COit+ ÃŽÂ ²2 MOit + ÃŽÂ ²3 (MO)2it + ÃŽÂ ²4 BSit + ÃŽÂ ²5 BCit + ÃŽÂ ²6 CEOit + ÃŽÂ ²7 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²8 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (1) COit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 MTBit + ÃŽÂ ²2 LIQit + ÃŽÂ ²3 BETit + ÃŽÂ ²4 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²5 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (2) MOit = ÃŽÂ ²0 + ÃŽÂ ²1 MTBit + ÃŽÂ ²2 LIQit + ÃŽÂ ²3 BETit + ÃŽÂ ²4 LTAit + ÃŽÂ ²5 LEVit + ÃŽÂ µit (3) Empirical results 5.1 Univariate tests Summary statistics relating to our different variables are represented in Table 1 that reports the mean values, standard deviations, minima and maxima of variables for the 181 observations. Table 1: Descriptive statistics Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum MTB CO MO BS BC CEO LTA LEV LIQ BET 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 0.386 0.422 0.026 9.215 3.685 0.254 17.784 0.561 0.184 0.664 0.597 0.179 0.062 1.782 1.195 0.436 0.917 0.486 0.275 0.623 -1.049 0.113 0 5 1 0 16.148 0.046 -0.687 -0.283 1.999 1 0.462 12 5 1 21.102 3.564 0.746 2.641 Mean values of ownership concentration and managerial ownership were 42.2 % and 2.5 %, respectively. The Market-to-Book ratio had a mean value of 0.386. We note that the boards of directors of Tunisian firms had, 9.2 directors, on average. In addition, there were only 3.68 independent non-executive directors on our sample boards representing, 40 % of board membership, on average. It is important to note that this number probably overstates the fraction of really independent directors given that the corporate sector in Tunisia is small and it may be difficult to hire true independent outsiders. Moreover, this increases doubts about the independence and robustness of boards and about the possible positive impact of these directors on firm performance in case they actually have any effective monitoring functions. Furthermore, in only 25.4 % of all firms in our sample, there was no CEO duality, which means that the CEO was also the chairman of the board in 74.6 % of Tunisian firms. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of the independent variables. The correlations that should be noted are the (-0.66) correlations between leverage (LEV) and liquidity (LIQ) and the 0.56 correlations between board size (BS) and board composition (BC). None of the remaining variables is correlated to a level that is worth noting. Table 2ÂÂ  : Correlation coefficients of independent variables CO MO BS BC CEO LTA LEV LIQ BET CO 1 MO -0.199** 1 BS 0.257** 0.074 1 BC 0.194** -0.195** 0.561** 1 CEO -0.117 0.43** 0.143* -0.037 1 LTA 0.147 * -0.168* 0.367** 0.259** -0.262** 1 LEV 0.321** -0.078 0.133* 0.311** -0.129* 0.148* 1 LIQ -0.029 -0.031 0.030 -0.016 0.117 -0.318** -0.669** 1 BET -0.076 -0.028 0.085 -0.178* -0.217* 0.319** -0.249** 0.182* 1 **, * denotes significance levels at 1% and 10%, respectively. To test for multicollinearity, we computed the variable inflation factor (VIF) for each variable. The results showed that there were no variables included in the tests with VIF 1.95. Thus, multicollinearity did not to seem to be a problem for the results. 5.2 Multivariate analysis 5.2.1 Linear regression results Linear regression results are reported in Table 3. By focusing on firm performance equations, we remark that MTB ratio decreases with ownership concentration and increases with managerial ownership. These findings reflect the disadvantages (or costs) of ownership concentration and the benefits of managerial ownership. On the one hand, ownership concentration deteriorates the firm market performance and, thus, does not reduce the conflicting interests between large and minority shareholders. Actually, it is argued that ownership concentration increases the majority-minority conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and reduces the market liquidity. Table 3ÂÂ  : Linear regression MTB MTB CO MO MTB -0.02 0.005 (-0.20) (0.99) CO -2.66 (-2.06)** MO 0.43 (2.52)** MOÂÂ ² -0.833 (-0.27) BS -0.349 -0.34 0.005 -0.005 (-1.83)* (-1.77)*** (0.94) (-2.16)** BC 0.22 0.87 0.005 0.006 (1.33) (1.32) (0.41) (1.17) CEO -0.18 -0.328 -0.07 0.06 (-0.19) (-1.49) (-1.69)* (2.05)** LTA 0.129 0.149 -0.03 -0.003 (1.69)* (1.89)* (-1.77 * (-1.22) LEV -0.448 -0.424 -0.02 -0.001 (-3.29)*** (-3.03)*** (-0.74) (-0.21) Const -2.178 -2.451 0.47 -0.08 (-1.58) (-1.71) (1.43) (-0.06) R-sq 0.295 0.263 0.129 0.258 The t-statistics are in parentheses below estimated coefficients. ***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. On the other hand, MO decreases conflict of interest between managers and outside shareholders. This result is consistent with the theory and with previous studies stating that agency problem between managers and outside shareholders is less observed in highly concentrated equity ownership structure (Davies et al. 2005). It is important to note that the majority of Tunisian firms are family-owned companies. In addition, the manager (CEO) is, in general, a family member; if not, he is well controlled by the family members represented on the board. For this reason, large shareholders and/or managers worry about their own interests which are strongly related to the firm performance. Furthermore, we test for a curvilinear relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Thus, our estimation shows that MOÂÂ ² affects negatively but insignificantly the MTB ratio. This finding refutes the hypothesis of curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm perfor mance. With respect to the board variables, BS and CEO separation are negatively related to MTB ratio, and BC presents a positive coefficient. However, only BS is statistically significant. This last result casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent non-executive directors as monitoring mechanism in Tunisia and may be due to the difficulty in recruiting truly independent board members in a small market because there are generally interrelationships (family, friendship) between internal and external board members. Chen et al. (2005) reported a negative coefficient for CEO and positive coefficients related to BS and BC. Considering the third and fourth equations where firm performance is the independent variable in addition to board variables. MTB ratio was found to be related negatively to ownership concentration and positively to MO, but these associations are insignificant. The first finding proved that Tunisian shareholders were less concerned with the market performance. In fact, Tunisian shareholders are not well informed about the advantages of market performance. Hence, they are not able to accept it. Although these relationships are not significant, they show that there is a reverse causation between ownership structure and firm performance. To check this possibility, we use the simultaneous equations analysis. On the other hand, BS and BC affect positively and insignificantly ownership concentration. In addition, we found that board leadership structure (CEO) appeared to be negatively and significantly related to concentrated ownership. The negative association between CEO and CO means that when there is a separation of functions of management and control, the interests of the largest shareholders are not maintained. The explanation that can be suggested by this result is that the board as a monitoring mechanism takes into account the interests of all shareholders including the minority ones, and this may prevent the opportunity to expropriate. Furthermore, we remark that only BS and CEO had a positive significant relationship with managerial ownership (MO). This corroborates the finding in Mak and Li (2001). Finally, the reported results show that firm size (LTA) has a positive impact on MTB ratio. This result is consistent with previous studies stating that greater performance should be associated with larger firms (e.g. Davies et al. 2005). In the MO and CO equations, LTA presents again the predicted sign. In fact, the larger a firm is, the larger the capital sum investors need to hold will be. Thus, it would be logical that managerial ownership and concentrated ownership decrease with firm size. Concerning leverage, it was found to be negative in all regressions. However, it is only significant in performance equations. 5.2.2 2SLS regression results 2SLS estimation results are reported in Table 4. By focusing on the first equation, ownership concentration is shown to be negatively related to MTB ratio. This finding reflects the fact that even if large shareholders perform efficiently their monitoring functions on management in order to improve firm performance, they are not still interested in market performance and this is explained by the culture of the Tunisian investor who is not yet ready to accept the advantages of market performance. However, this association is not significant. Table 4: 2SLS regression MTB CO MO MTB -0.05 0.008 (-2.04)** (3.52)*** CO -9.82 (-0.45) MO 137.61 (3.34)*** MOÂÂ ² -23.16 (-0.64) BS 0.08 (2.80)*** BC -0.09 (-1.75)* CEO -3.69 (-1.27) LTA 0.07 -0.12 0.06 (0.08) (-2.22)** (1.94)*** LEV -3.94 0.09 -0.02 (-2.86)** (2.25)** (-1.16) LIQ 0.30 -0.05 (2.50)** (-2.41)** BET -0.09 -0.02 (-3.30)*** (-1.11) Const -3.32 0.37 0.17 (-0.14) (0.80) (2.00) R-sq 0.362 0.213 0.193 The t-statistics are in parentheses below estimated coefficients. ***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. On the other hand, BS was found to have a positive impact on firm market performance. On the contrary, CEO and BC affected the market performance negatively. These results show, on the one hand, that the separation of functions is associated with a lower level of market performance. On the other hand, and once again, there are some doubts on the effectiveness of independent non-executive directors as a monitoring mechanism in Tunisian firms. However, only CEOs coefficient is insignificant. Our results show that corporate governance mechanisms (BC and CEO) had proved to be weak in Tunisian companies. Actually, larger boards and the absence of truly independent non-executive directors may result in ineffective corporate governance. MO is positively and strongly associated with MTB ratio. Alternatively, the positive coefficient may be explained by the alignment hypothesis. In addition, the insignificant impact of the squared value of MO on MTB ratio disproved the nonlinearity relation b etween these two variables. By focusing on the ownership concentration regression, we note that all coefficients of different variables are significant. We show that MTB ratio has a negative impact on ownership concentration. This result confirms the one found in the firm performance regression. Market risk (BET) affects CO negatively. This result is consistent with the fact that when the largest shareholders do not effectively make predictions about future economic conditions, the market risk makes higher ownership more costly. The last regression relating to managerial ownership indicates that MTB ratio is found to be positively related to the MO. This result implies that firm market performance increases with the importance of shares held by managers. BET is shown to have a negative and insignificant effect on managerial ownership. This finding implies that managers are risk averse and they would like to reduce their participation as long as the market risk increases. Finally, for the 2SLS estimation of the ownership equations, we pay attention to the role of liquidity in explaining variations in ownership structure. In the CO regression, LIQ presents a positive coefficient. This result suggests that the largest shareholders and minority shareholders have divergent interests. In the MO regression, LIQ presents a negative sign. This result suggests that management and shareholders have aligned interests. Our finding is inconsistent with the one found by Davies et al. (2005) who reported a strong positive association between firm level liquidity and managerial ownership. Overall, our results indicate that although ownership variables (concentrated ownership and managerial ownership) are determined by firm performance, firm performance itself is partly determined by these variables. Those findings show that there is a reverse causation between firm performance and ownership structure in which these variables can be influenced, among other observed factors, by each other. Therefore, our findings prove the endogeneity of ownership structure. Conclusion Our study examines the roles played by two aspects of ownership structure that is ownership concentration and managerial ownership. In addition, we included board characteristics as another mechanism from corporate governance theory. We analysed a sample of 23 listed Tunisian firms over the period 1998-2006 and we tried to answer our core question: does ownership structure affect firm performance and is it as well affected by it? Our empirical analysis under linear regression shows a negative (positive) and significant association between ownership concentration (managerial ownership) and MTB performance. However, we find that MTB has a negative (positive) but insignificant impact on ownership concentration (managerial ownership). Accordingly, these results led partly to the conclusion that there was a reverse causation between ownership structure and firm performance. Hence, our 2SLS regression proved the existence of endogeneity and of a two-way causality between ownership variables and firm performance. Concerning board characteristics, board leadership structure (CEO) is negatively associated with ownership concentration. This finding revealed that CEO duality was much more likely in family-owned and controlled firms whereby the ownership was concentrated. In addition, we also found that CEO had a negative impact on MTB. Our findings showed that board composition presented, in all linear regressions, a po sitive and insignificant coefficient. This result casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent non-executive directors as a monitoring mechanism in Tunisia. It may be due to the difficulty recruiting truly independent board members in a small market because there are generally interrelationships between internal and external board members. Concerning board size, we found that it was positively and insignificantly related to ownership concentration. For the other three regressions, it presented a negative and significant sign. Therefore, our findings concerning board characteristics provide evidence that the board, as the principal monitoring mechanism in Tunisian firms, appears weak. These conclusions arose from linear regressions relating to board characteristics were confirmed under 2SLS regression. This paper provides two major contributions. First, we provide the evidence that endogeneity and the two-way causality between ownership variables and firm performance already exist in Tunisian listed firms. This means that variation in firm performance affects variation in ownership structure (ownership concentration and managerial ownership) and is also affected by it. Second, our findings disproved the hypothesis of curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Indeed, our analysis extends previous studies in this area and failed to capture this nonlinear association. This is may be due to the insignificant level of shares hold by managers in Tunisian listed firms. Despite these findings, we failed to fully explore alternative specifications of board characteristics in relation to corporate ownership and corporate performance. One implication that can be derived from this analysis is that corporate governance in Tunisian firms needs to be more strengt hened. In addition, more effort is needed in order to ensure the true independence of non-executive directors to make sure that they are able to perform an adequate monitoring function. Another potential explanation may be in the endogenous relationship between firm performance and board characteristics. Future studies in this area may focus more on these points and should detect the endogenous role that can be played by board characteristics.

William Shakespeare s Much Ado About Nothing - 1204 Words

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